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I. INTRODUCTION
The high cost of education and decreasing academic performance
presented an opportunity for the education technology industry (“EdTech”),
with a worldwide market exceeding $250 billion annually, to attract large
investment and development in the United States.1 Promising cost savings
and productivity efficiency, EdTech companies offer educators big data
analysis by collecting and providing access to student information,
assessment results, and business intelligence tools.2 As a result of the influx
in datafication of students, the educational market is the third-highest target
for data hackers, behind only the health and financial sectors.3 Data breaches
of education records place student safety at risk, ranging from immediate
threats of danger and cyberbullying, to long-term risks of identity theft.4
1. See Jake Williams, U.S. EdTech Market Is Biggest Globally, Reports Says,
EDSCOOP (Feb. 13, 2020), https://edscoop.com/u-s-edtech-market-biggest-globallyreport-says/ (reporting worldwide EdTech market value is projected to reach $252 billion
in 2020 with the United States, home to forty-three percent of EdTech companies,
leading the world in EdTech venture capital funding); see also Mike Montgomery,
Edtech: The Savior Our Schools Need Should Be a Startup Gold Mine, FORBES (May 7,
2019, 6:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikemontgomery/2019/05/07/edtechthe-savior-our-schools-need-should-be-a-startup-gold-mine/#337a1b9799c0 (arguing
the need for clear standards and goals when implementing technology to effectively
impact learning; mere presence of technology is not enough).
2. See OMIDYAR NETWORK, SCALING ACCESS AND IMPACT: REALIZING THE POWER
OF EDTECH 4 (2019) (suggesting educational models integrating technology can be
impactful and cost-effective); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REIMAGINING THE ROLE OF
TECHNOLOGY IN EDUCATION: 2017 NATIONAL EDUCATION TECHNOLOGY PLAN UPDATE
55 (2017) (describing how EdTech provides diverse data sets to create a more complete
picture and provide feedback and personalized learning strategies). But see SOPHIE
SHANK, ABDUL LATIF JAMEEL POVERTY ACTION LAB, WILL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFORM
EDUCATION FOR THE BETTER? 9 (2019) (cautioning that the effectiveness of technology
on education outcomes varies depending on the implementation strategy).
3. Meghan Bogardus Cortez, Education Sector Data Breaches Skyrocket in 2017,
EDTECH MAG. (Dec. 1, 2017), https://edtechmagazine.com/higher/article/2017/12/edu
cation-sector-data-breaches-skyrocket-2017 (showing a 103% increase in education data
breaches in the first half of 2017).
4. See id. (noting that seventy-four percent of data breaches in higher education
were caused by outsiders with malicious intentions).

2020

BIG TECH MAKES BIG DATA OUT OF YOUR CHILD

447

High investigation costs and ransomware payments also present financial
consequences for students.5
With the increase of technology use in schools, parents, students, and
privacy advocates have growing concerns that current regulation is
inadequate to meet the rapidly advancing technology EdTech companies
employ.6 Commercial companies must abide by the Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”), which regulates online operators’
collection and use of children’s personally identifiable information (“PII”).7
However, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the enforcement agency
overseeing COPPA, issued an exception for data disclosed by schools to
online operators acting as authorized educational partners.8 The FTC
maintains that student PII disclosed as an education record is regulated by
the Family Educational Right and Privacy Act (“FERPA”).9 The
legislation’s overly broad definition of education records, combined with the
2011 Amendments expanding FERPA to permit schools to disclose data to
third parties, creates a loophole for the EdTech industry to avoid COPPA
regulation regarding student data.10 As a result, commercial companies can
5. See Bob Sullivan, FBI Warns EdTech Needs Stronger Defenses for Students’
Personal Data, SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 11, 2019), https://securityintelligence.
com/fbi-warns-edtech-needs-stronger-defenses-for-students-personal-data/ (reporting
that hackers used stolen student data to extort parents and schools).
6. See Sara Friedman, Survey: More Teacher Training Needed for Ed Tech Tools,
JOURNAL (Oct. 14, 2019), https://thejournal.com/articles/2019/10/14/survey-moreteacher-training-needed-for-ed-tech-tools.aspx (attributing increased use of classroom
technology to schools replacing aging technology with cloud-based solutions and
integrated learning experiences).
7. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506
(2018).
8. 16 C.F.R. § 312.3 (2020); see also Isaac Mamaysky, The FTC Has Its Sights on
COPPA, and Edtech Providers Should Take Notice, EDSURGE (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.edsurge.com/news/2019-10-08-the-ftc-has-its-sights-on-coppa-andedtech-providers-should-take-notice (“[S]chools can currently consent as the parents’
agent when websites collect information solely for the benefit of the students or the
school and not for a commercial purpose.”).
9. Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. TRADE COMM’N
[hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM’N, Complying with COPPA], https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-questions
(last
visited Feb. 28, 2020) (follow “N. COPPA and Schools” hyperlink); see Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(F) (2018); see
also JOEL REIDENBERG ET AL., FORDHAM LAW SCH. CTR. ON LAW & INFO. POLICY,
PRIVACY AND CLOUD COMPUTING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 11 (2013) (explaining COPPA
does not apply to data obtained directly from a school).
10. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1)(i)(B)(2) (2020) (permitting educational agencies to
disclose student PII to contractors under direct control of the institution or providing
services the institution would typically perform without the consent of students or
parents); Henry Kronk, Student Data Security Is at Risk. We Need to Update FERPA,
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quickly amass large amounts of data and potentially avoid the FTC’s
oversight of COPPA compliance by contracting directly with schools.11 This
practice runs afoul of legislative intent for both FERPA and COPPA, places
student data at risk by creating a vacuum of oversight, and leaves little
recourse for violations of data collection or use in the EdTech industry.12
This Comment argues that the EdTech industry is exploiting a loophole in
federal regulations to grow the business sector by mining children’s data
online at the expense of student privacy. Part II provides background on
current laws protecting student data, how the laws are applied to the EdTech
industry, and how the acts are enforced. Part III analyzes the application of
FERPA to the EdTech industry, finding the collection of PII incompatible
with the education record standard, and arguing that the Department of
Education (“ED”) is ill-equipped to provide oversight or deterrence for
commercial companies. Part IV presents solutions to increase security of
student data. Part V concludes with a review of the growing imperative to
address safety concerns of EdTech applications in schools and recaps how
the regulation loopholes are increasing the risks to student privacy.
II. HOW EDTECH IS AMASSING STUDENT DATA IN THE UNITED STATES
Students, parents, and privacy advocates are raising concerns about data
protection as an influx of capital in EdTech companies has led to more
schools utilizing third-party commercial products such as cloud computing
services, online applications, and data analytics tools.13 As more commercial
EdTech tools are integrated into the U.S. education system, schools struggle
ELEARNING INSIDE (Nov. 25, 2018), https://news.elearninginside.com/student-datasecurity-is-at-risk-we-need-to-update-ferpa/ (describing the loophole in FERPA
regulation that permits schools to disclose student PII to EdTech companies without
parental or student consent by considering the commercial entity an authorized school
official).
11. See Natasha Singer, How Google Took Over the Classroom, N.Y. TIMES (May
13, 2017) [hereinafter Singer, How Google Took Over], https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/13/technology/google-education-chromebooks-schools.html (showing that
Google is amassing a substantial amount of user data on minors due to its use in more
than half of primary and secondary schools).
12. See JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22341, THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL
RIGHTS AND PRIVACY ACT (FERPA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW 6 (2013) (citing the need to
revise data practices to increase transparency for students and parents, while closing
current regulation loopholes).
13. See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 1–2 (finding parents have rising
concerns with third-party cloud data collection); see also John Rogers, Education Is the
New Healthcare, and Other Trends Shaping Edtech Investing, EDSURGE (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.edsurge.com/news/2020-02-28-education-is-the-new-healthcare-andother-trends-shaping-edtech-investing (predicting an increase in privacy concerns as a
result of accelerated capital investments in EdTech).
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to enforce student data protection due to intersecting federal regulations,
COPPA, and FERPA, enforced through multiple agencies.14
a. Federal Regulations of Student Data Collection Practices
In 1974, Congress enacted FERPA to regulate schools’ practice of
releasing student information, and mandate a degree of parental oversight
and transparency.15 After the innovation of the internet and adoption of
online services, Congress enacted COPPA to regulate business practices for
collecting data from children online.16 Today, FERPA governs the
disclosure and use of student data from schools, and COPPA regulates
collection and use of children’s PII by online operators.17 As a commercial
industry conducting business with schools, EdTech operates within a crosssection of COPPA and FERPA.18
i. Overview of Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
FERPA protects students’ PII by regulating school policies involving
disclosure of student information and requiring parental transparency
regarding education records.19 However, not all school records fall within
FERPA regulation. To be considered a confidential FERPA record, the
material must be directly related to a student and be maintained by the

14. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Complying with COPPA, supra note 9 (describing
how schools must consider obligations under FERPA, COPPA, and potentially state
student privacy laws when disclosing information to online operators).
15. See FERPA and Access to Public Records, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (May 6,
2005), https://splc.org/2005/05/ferpa-and-access-to-public-records/ (describing FERPA
co-author Sen. James Buckley’s driving concerns behind presenting the legislation as the
lack of both parental access to student records and consistency in schools’ policies
governing disclosure of student records); see also Zach Greenberg, Let Ferpa Be Ferpa,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Let-FerpaBe-Ferpa/242232 (quoting Sen. James Buckley) (stating the reason for FERPA was “to
protect the rights of students and their parents and to prevent the abuse of personal files
and data in the area of federally assisted educational activities”).
16. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
6506 (2018); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, Complying with COPPA, supra note 9
(stating the main purpose of COPPA under sub-header A “General Questions about the
COPPA Rule”).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 6502; Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20
U.S.C. § 1232(a) (2018).
18. See Student Privacy and Ed Tech, FED. TRADE COMM’N, [hereinafter FED. TRADE
COMM’N, Student Privacy] https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2017/12/
student-privacy-ed-tech (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (focusing on how the rising
integration of EdTech applications is causing schools to evaluate the intersection of
FERPA and COPPA regulations).
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2020).
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school.20 While FERPA does not define the direct link requirement for
education records, schools can conduct a case-by-case analysis by applying
guidelines from the ED.21 When evaluating photos or videos containing
students, the ED considers factors such as the activity depicted, the intended
uses by the educational institution, and whether the image contains PII
otherwise found in the student’s record.22 The ED further states that student
images incidentally captured, as in the background of a photo, are not
considered directly linked to a student.23
To be considered an education record under FERPA, the document or file
must be maintained by the school or an agent of the school.24 In Owasso
Independent School District v. Falco,25 the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned
that FERPA’s language implies schools are required to demonstrate a
temperament of permanency or intent to retain a file for a student record to
be considered maintained.26 The Court held that peer-graded quizzes were
not education records under FERPA because the grade was maintained by
students rather than an institution.27 Similarly, a federal court ruled in S.A.
v. Tulane County Office of Education28 that e-mails stored on individual
teachers’ hard drives are not education records until the document is
centrally located.29 Therefore, data collected online may be covered under
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A) (“‘[E]ducation records’ means . . . records, files,
documents, and other materials which — (i) contain information directly related to a
student; and (ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person
acting for such agency or institution.”). But see What Records Are Exempted from
FERPA?, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/what-records-areexempted-ferpa (last visited Aug. 16, 2020) (noting exceptions to education records,
including personal observations).
21. See FAQs on Photos and Videos under FERPA, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
[hereinafter FAQS ON PHOTOS] https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/faqs-photos-andvideos-under-ferpa (last visited Aug. 16, 2020) (listing factors to consider when
evaluating whether a photo or video is directly linked to a student).
22. Id.
23. See id. (hypothesizing that a photo capturing basketball players and spectators in
the background is only directly linked to focused players; the image is not directly linked
to students portrayed in the background); see also STUDENT PRESS L. CTR., supra note
15 (suggesting the FERPA authors did not intend for the law “to apply to documents that
only tangentially refer to students” or do not influence school decision-making about
students).
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A)(ii).
25. 534 U.S. 426 (2002).
26. See id. at 432–33.
27. Id.
28. No. CV F 08–1215 LJO GSA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93170 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5,
2009).
29. See id. at *10 (reasoning that Congress did not “contemplate that educational
records are maintained in numerous places,” when enacting FERPA, but instead intended
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FERPA if the information is maintained by the school, but the same
information exchanged via an email or messaging application not maintained
by the school is not covered.30
FERPA grants parents access and some control over education records,
such as the right to inspect and the ability to amend inaccurate or misleading
information.31 Additionally, FERPA requires schools to obtain written
parental consent prior to releasing non-directory student information.32
However, FERPA permits exceptions to the parental consent requirement if
schools are releasing records to officials for educational purposes, to
accrediting organizations, to parties in connection with financial aid, or to
organizations conducting studies on behalf of the school.33 In 2011, the ED
further revised FERPA guidelines to authorize schools to disclose student
PII to third-party companies if the company is a designated school official.34
The exception does not create privacy standards for the commercial
companies; the law simply mandates that officials comply with the
individual school’s student data policy.35
The ED enforces FERPA; as a result, there are limited remedies for
violations.36 Schools in violation of FERPA may lose federal funding or
become ineligible for future funding.37 However, this remedy has never been
used.38 Students are unable to pursue private claims of action for FERPA
violations because the statute failed to create any individual rights for

‘maintain’ to mean records kept in a single secure permanent storage space).
30. Id. at *11–12 (holding that emails are temporary and are only education records
if printed and placed in a student file).
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a), (b); see Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA), ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/student/ferpa/ (last visited
Aug. 10, 2020) (discussing the importance of parents’ ability to access student
information in order to protect their children’s interests as a driving concern for
proposing FERPA).
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (requiring parental consent for schools to release
education records or PII).
33. Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a) (2020).
34. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(6) (granting schools the right to disclose student records to
third parties providing services otherwise performed by the school, if under direct control
of the school and subject to FERPA rules).
35. See id. § 99.31(a)(1)(i)(B)(3)(ii).
36. See id. § 99.67(a) (listing the remedies for FERPA violations as withholding
federal funding, compelling compliance by cease and desist orders, or ending funding
eligibility).
37. Id.
38. See Student Privacy, FERPA, and Its Weakening by the US Department of
Education, PARENT COAL. STUDENT PRIVACY [hereinafter PARENT COAL.], https://
www.studentprivacymatters.org/ferpa-changes/ (last visited on Aug. 16, 2020).
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enforcement.39 If a student believes his FERPA rights were violated, he can
file a complaint with the ED.40 The ED reviews each complaint on a caseby-case basis to determine if a school violated disclosure of student PII.41
The ED may determine a school did not violate FERPA if the disclosed
information falls outside of the Act’s regulation, such as data that does not
meet the requirements of education records.42
ii. History of Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
In 1998, Congress passed COPPA to govern the collection of children’s
PII from online operators.43 The law specifies business responsibilities when
collecting and using children’s PII online.44 A core element of the law,
COPPA requires online operators to provide notice and receive parental
consent prior to collecting PII from children under the age of thirteen.45
When first enacted, COPPA focused on PII used to contact a child, such
as name, address, and phone number.46 In 2012, the FTC amended COPPA
regulations to include persistent identifiers, such as cookies or fingerprints;
39. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 288–89 (2002) (ruling an individual
cannot sue to enforce FERPA); see also Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir.
1989) (noting there is no language in FERPA indicating congressional intent for a private
right of action); Smith v. Duquesne Univ., 612 F. Supp 72, 80 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (holding
there is no private remedy for FERPA violations because the underlying purpose was to
stop careless policies of releasing records, not ensuring student individual privacy).
40. 34 C.F.R. § 99.63 (instructing eligible individuals to file FERPA complaints with
the ED); see 20 U.S.C. § 1232(f) (2018) (requiring the ED to establish an office “to
investigate, process, review, and adjudicate” all violations of FERPA).
41. See 34 U.S.C. § 99.64 (describing how FERPA complaints are individually
investigated); FAQS ON PHOTOS, supra note 21 (confirming the need for case-by-case
analysis for evaluating potential education records such as photographs and video
recordings).
42. See, e.g., Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I–011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 432–33
(2002) (holding peer-graded papers are not education records because schools do not
maintain them).
43. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2018); see also Laurel Jamtgaard, Big Bird Meets
Big Brother: A Look at the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 16 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER HIGH TECH. L.J. 385, 387 (2000) (summarizing COPPA’s enactment as a
response to concerns regarding online collection of children’s data without parental
consent).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A) (regulating when website operators can collect a
child’s personal information); see also INTERACTIVE ADVERT. BUREAU, GUIDE TO
NAVIGATING COPPA: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMPLIANCE IN AN INCREASINGLY
REGULATED CHILDREN’S MEDIA ENVIRONMENT 2 (2019), https://www.iab.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/IAB_2019-10-09_Navigating-COPPA-Guide.pdf
(summarizing COPPA’s parameters and defining identifiers regulated by the law).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A).
46. See Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1303, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998);
15 U.S.C. § 6501(8).
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IP address and geolocation; and a range of media files now prevalent online
such as photos and video recordings.47 Online services that target children
are required to comply with COPPA regulations, regardless of the device
used to access the service.48
Under the statute, the FTC enforces COPPA compliance.49 Online
operators who fail to comply with COPPA regulations may face civil
penalties of up to $43,280 per violation.50 The FTC can also require a
company to change business practices as a remedy for a COPPA violation.51
Currently, the FTC only investigates COPPA compliance by businesses; the
FTC excludes schools from COPPA enforcement, stating that FERPA
regulates the enforcement of school data disclosure.52
b. The Information EdTech Is Collecting on Students
EdTech businesses offer schools access to big data, which can drive
learning initiatives for students as well as financial decision making for
administrators.53 A prime example of EdTech’s presence is Google’s
integration into public schools: in 2017, more than half of K-12 students
used Google’s education apps, and Google Chromebooks accounted for
more than fifty percent of mobile devices in schools.54 Similarly, EdTech
47. 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2020); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, Complying with
COPPA, supra note 9.
48. See INTERACTIVE ADVERT. BUREAU, supra note 44, at 2 (explaining COPPA
applies to all online services, including shared devices).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(c); 16 C.F.R. § 312.9 (stating violations of COPPA will be
enforced by the FTC).
50. FED. TRADE COMM’N, Complying with COPPA, supra note 9 (outlining the
penalties for violating COPPA); see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google
and YouTube Will Pay Record $170 Million for Alleged Violations of Children’s
Privacy Law (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/09/
google-youtube-will-pay-record-170-million-alleged-violations (reporting the record
settlement Google will pay the FTC and New York for violating COPPA rule).
51. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, TRUSTe Settles FTC Charges it
Deceived Consumers Through Its Privacy Seal Program (Nov. 17, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/11/truste-settles-ftc-charges-itdeceived-consumers-through-its (describing that settlement requirements include
prohibiting misrepresentations about TRUSTe practices in messaging).
52. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f) (2018); FED. TRADE COMM’N, Complying with
COPPA, supra note 9 (noting school operators need to consider FERPA regulations,
adding that compliance is administered by the ED).
53. See Benjamin Herold, How (and Why) Ed-Tech Companies Are Tracking
Students’ Feelings, EDUC. WK. (June 12, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/
articles/2018/06/12/how-and-why-ed-tech-companies-are-tracking.html
(describing
how data analytics are driving adaptive learning, developing personalized programs to
identify knowledge gaps, and increasing efficacy).
54. See FRIDA ALIM ET AL., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., SPYING ON STUDENTS:
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company ClassDojo claims that more than ninety-five percent of U.S. K-8
schools are actively using its application.55 Many EdTech applications
provide big data insights driven by student’s PII, including behavioral data,
such as tracking student actions and engagement with others.56
There is a wide range of data collected by EdTech applications.57 Direct
data is voluntarily entered or transferred from schools to EdTech companies,
such as account information submitted to create a user profile within the
application.58 Examples of direct information include student names, student
IDs, contact information, or grades.59 Direct information can be supplied by
schools, teachers, parents, or student users.60 When using online applications
for educational activities, a potential pitfall for schools is students’ tendency
to share PII.61 A 2013 study found that teens under the age of eighteen
exhibit a high likelihood of revealing PII online, and that teens are more
likely to share information about themselves online than in the past.62 The
study also found that only nine percent of teens had “a high level of concern
about third-party access to their data.”63
Beyond direct data, EdTech companies collect indirect or trace data.64
Indirect data is information collected in the application itself, such as
SCHOOL-ISSUED DEVICES AND STUDENT PRIVACY 5 (2017) (detailing the heavy use of
school-issued devices for K–12 students).
55. Press, CLASSDOJO, https://www.classdojo.com/press/ (last visited Aug. 16,
2020) (describing the prevalent use of ClassDojo by teachers to share photographs and
videos of students, creating a communication hub for teachers, students, and parents).
56. See ALIM ET AL., supra note 54, at 7–8 (stating the ED is encouraging schools to
adopt the use of big data from EdTech applications to improve assessments of learning
objectives and educational innovation).
57. See CHILDREN’S COMM’R, WHO KNOWS WHAT ABOUT ME? 5–8 (2018),
https://pwxp5srs168nsac2n3fnjyaa-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/Childrens-commissioner-Who-Knows-What-About-Me-iinternet-matters.pdf (explaining the types of children data being collected online).
58. See id. at 6 (describing the “direct data” collected on students).
59. Id.
60. See id. at 5–6 (providing examples of “direct data” that schools provide to
EdTech companies).
61. See Perry Drake, Is Your Use of Social Media FERPA Compliant?, EDUCAUSE
REV. (Feb. 24, 2014), https://er.educause.edu/articles/2014/2/is-your-use-of-socialmedia-ferpa-compliant (imagining various scenarios of data sharing online).
62. See Mary Madden et al., Teens, Social Media, and Privacy, PEW RES. CTR. (May
21, 2013), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2013/05/21/teens-social-media-andprivacy/ (finding that ninety-one percent of teens report posting photos of themselves,
ninety-two percent share their name online, eighty-two percent share their birth date, and
seventy-one percent reveal the town or city they live in).
63. Id.
64. See CHILDREN’S COMM’R, supra note 57, at 6 (explaining the types of child data
collected online includes “inferred” data and “data that is ‘given off’”).
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metadata, geolocation, IP address, and browser data.65 The programs capture
user interactions within the application and automatically upload the data.66
For example, Summit Learning’s platform collects geolocations, IP
addresses, and browsing behaviors.67 Many companies are working on
applications to capture students’ eye movements to measure engagement,
whether through sensors in classrooms or cameras on laptops.68 The Paris
School of Business is already utilizing laptop webcams to analyze student
eye movements in its online program and alert students when interest
decreases.69
Potentially the most valuable data within the EdTech industry is inferred
data, which combines direct and indirect information to create predictive
models based on algorithms.70 By providing access to big data and applying
predictive analytics, EdTech businesses capitalize on advancements in
technology data-mining to present trends and patterns within student data.71
c. Safety Risks and Privacy Concerns for EdTech Data Collection
Schools generate a substantial amount of valuable data with more than
fifty million students in public school each year, which can entice hackers to
the EdTech industry’s large collection of student data.72 In September 2018,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) issued a warning that the “rapid
proliferation of education technologies in U.S. schools poses privacy and
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Privacy Policy, SUMMIT LEARNING, https://www.summitlearning.org/

privacy-center/privacy-policy (last updated June 22, 2020) (clarifying that Summit
Learning automatically collects certain types of visitor information).
67. See id.
68. See Erika Gimbel, Biometric Tech Can Track How Well Students Are Paying
Attention, EDTECH MAG. (Feb. 23, 2018), https://edtechmagazine.com/k12/article/
2018/02/biometric-technology-tracks-students-attention (describing the potential uses of
biometric tracking in education and predicting they will emerge in U.S. classrooms by
the year 2028).
69. See id. (describing the program Nestor, an application that uses AI-software to
analyze students’ eye movements in remote learning classes and generate alerts and
create custom quizzes based on a student’s attentiveness to the online program).
70. See CHILDREN’S COMM’R, supra note 57, at 6.
71. See Samuel Greengard, How Predictive Analytics Will Improve Learning,
EDTECH MAG. (Oct. 31, 2006), https://edtechmagazine.com/k12/article/2006/10/howpredictive-analytics-will-improve-learning (predicting the increase and impact of
predictive modeling in education); see also CHILDREN’S COMM’R, supra note 57, at 6, 9
(explaining that privacy policies for inferred data are often the least transparent, with
many parents and students often lacking awareness of the data collected).
72. See Back to School Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.
gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372 (last visited Aug. 16, 2020) (reporting that 50.7 million
students would attend public schools for the 2019–2020 school year).
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safety risks for children.”73 Cybercriminals find the education sector an
appealing target because it presents a large amount of data, collected in
disparate, often ill-managed systems.74 Parents and privacy advocates fear
EdTech companies are further placing student data at risk due to the high
concentration of data aggregation, lack of transparency on data collection,
and poor security protocols.75
Moreover, studies show that schools are often unprepared to protect
student data collected in EdTech applications.76 Research conducted by the
Fordham Center on Law and Information Policy (“Fordham CLIP”) in 2013
suggested schools are not prepared to adequately address data governance or
protection when data collection is outsourced to third-party services.77
Ninety-five percent of school districts in the study utilized cloud computing
solutions for data mining, but fewer than seven percent of the school
contracts restricted companies’ use of student data for marketing purposes.78
The study also found many schools are ill-prepared to support FERPA
regulations related to contracts with online operators.79 Unsecured services
lead to potential data breaches, which place students’ safety at risk.80
73. Benjamin Herold, FBI Raises Alarm on Ed Tech and Student Data Privacy,
Security, EDUC. WK. (Sept. 13, 2018, 11:18 AM) [hereinafter Herold, FBI Raises Alarm
on EdTech], https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/DigitalEducation/2018/09/fbi_raises_al
arm_ed_tech_privacy.html; see Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Education
Technologies: Data Collection and Unsecured Systems Could Pose Risks to Students
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.ic3.gov/media/2018/180913.aspx (warning of malicious
use of sensitive PII after uncovering two large data breaches resulting in public access to
millions of students’ data in 2017).
74. See Herold, FBI Raises Alarm on EdTech, supra note 73 (warning that school
districts were being targeted and that “most data disclosures are caused by human error”);
see also Cortez, supra note 3 (characterizing universities as a “juicy target” for hackers
due to the large quantity of users).
75. See Barbara Kurshan, The Elephant in the Room with EdTech Data Privacy,
FORBES (June 22, 2017, 1:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/barbarakurshan/2017/
06/22/the-elephant-in-the-room-with-edtech-data-privacy/#37d57d7e57a5
(arguing
EdTech applications that consolidate data create security risks by “mak[ing] it possible
for a single hacked administrator login to reveal a swath of student data”).
76. See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 24 (finding many school districts in the
study failed to have adequate data governance policies for outsourced data collection,
twenty percent of which had no policies addressing teacher’s use of these services).
77. See id. (noting that poor documentation of vendor contracts and limited access
to the full terms, in some instances, has serious implications for student data protection).
78. Id. at 19, 51–52 (finding school districts are using cloud services for reporting,
data analytics, and classroom functions).
79. See id. at 26–27 (finding sixty-six percent of schools surveyed did not include
the ability to audit or inspect vendors’ practices).
80. See CHILDREN’S COMM’R, supra note 57, at 12 (detailing security risks caused
by data breaches, including identity theft, cyberbullying, online impersonation, and
stranger danger of identifying physical locations of children through metadata).
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Data breaches risk student safety, lead to cyber bullying, contribute to
identity theft, and generate financial burdens on schools and parents.81
Beyond physical safety for abduction or harm from disclosing a child’s
location, online identifiers expose children to cyberbullying and online
impersonation.82 Bullying and online impersonation harm a child’s
wellbeing, and statistics show almost a third of U.S. children experience
cyberbullying.83
More troubling is that children who experience
cyberbullying are nine times more likely to become a victim of online
scams.84 Long-term impacts of data breaches like identity theft, may
actualize years after the breach, when bad actors use the information to open
accounts or steal the identity of a child when he or she reaches the age of
eighteen.85
Beyond future repercussions of identity theft, data breaches cause
significant financial hardships for schools and parents in the present.86 Due
to poor regulation and vendor agreements, schools pay a higher cost for
security breaches than other industries.87 In spite of warnings against it,
school districts have admitted to paying cybercriminals thousands of dollars
to regain control of student data in response to ransomware attacks.88 Even
parents are susceptible to financial extortion attempts from hackers. In 2018,
school districts closed classes after parents received text messages

81. See id.; see also, e.g., Mamaysky, supra note 8 (finding a majority of 6,000
popular children’s Android apps reviewed potentially violate COPPA).
82. See CHILDREN’S COMM’R, supra note 57, at 5–6, 20 (explaining types of data
being collected online).
83. See Christo Petrov, 47 Alarming Cyberbullying Statistics for 2020, TECHJURY,
https://techjury.net/stats-about/cyberbullying/#gref (last updated June 23, 2020)
(detailing how online “threats, mean comments, identify theft, racism, or attacks based
on their looks or religion” lead to depression, anxiety, and stress amongst children and
young people).
84. Id. (finding a direct correlation between cyberbullying and the likelihood of
falling victim to identity theft).
85. See Jessica Baron, Posting About Your Kids Online Could Damage Their
Futures, FORBES (Dec. 16, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jessicabaron/
2018/12/16/parents-who-post-about-their-kids-online-could-be-damaging-theirfutures/#398a258127b7 (discussing Barclays’s estimate that two-thirds of identity theft
by 2030 will be a result of oversharing information online).
86. See Sullivan, supra note 5 (describing how hackers use stolen student data to
extort parents or school districts).
87. Ramona Carr, The Rise of Education Data Breaches, ZETTASET,
https://www.zettaset.com/blog/education-data-breaches/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2020)
(detailing a Ponemon Institute study showing that schools pay a higher cost to remedy
data breaches than other industries, averaging $200 per student record).
88. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 5 (reporting “a Massachusetts school district paid
cybercriminals $10,000 in bitcoin to regain control” after a 2019 ransomware attack).
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threatening to expose their students’ PII.89
In addition to criminal activity, privacy advocates are concerned with
EdTech’s impact on student privacy. In November 2018, high school
students in Brooklyn walked out of school to protest the school’s disclosure
of student PII to the Summit Learning platform.90 The student organizers
published a letter written to Mark Zuckerberg, co-founder of Summit
Learning, detailing concerns about the extent of PII collected by the EdTech,
and Summit’s policy of disclosing this information to corporations.91
Similarly, privacy advocacy groups commissioned studies, published
reports, and filed lawsuits to further expose the student privacy issues arising
from schools’ implementation of EdTech applications.92
d. How EdTech Passes Off Regulation Compliance to Schools
While there are EdTech applications or services that fall outside of
FERPA’s education record definition, both the FTC and the ED rely on
schools to determine whether an online service meets the statute’s
standards.93 The FTC further states that online operators are responsible for
determining whether the collection and use of student data by third parties
complies with FERPA.94
Perhaps following the FTC’s lead, EdTech companies will often assign
schools the responsibility of determining whether all services provided fully
comply with FERPA through the company’s contract.95 To mitigate risk,
EdTech companies often include a contract provision requiring schools to
obtain verifiable consent from parents.96 This provision is designed to
89. See, e.g., id. (noting that school districts in Alabama, Montana, and Texas had to
close schools after parents were texted “ominous, personalized messages”).
90. Kronk, supra note 10 (detailing a walk out of almost 100 students from the
Secondary School for Journalism in Brooklyn in protest of the school’s disclosure of PII
to Summit Learning).
91. Id. (“Summit also says on its website that they plan to track us after graduation
through college and beyond. Summit collects too much of our personal information, and
discloses this to 19 other corporations.”).
92. See FEDER, supra note 12, at 6 (noting the legal challenges to the 2011 revised
FERPA guidelines allowing schools to disclose student information to third-party
companies).
93. See id. at 5–6.
94. FED. TRADE COMM’N, Complying with COPPA, supra note 9.
95. See id.
96. See Natasha Singer, Privacy Concerns for ClassDojo and Other Tracking Apps
for Schoolchildren, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/
11/17/technology/privacy-concerns-for-classdojo-and-other-tracking-apps-forschoolchildren.html (noting that commercial companies can offload COPPA compliance
for parental consent to schools within their service contracts).
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protect the online operator from COPPA violations and any resulting
financial repercussions in the event that an application or service exceeds the
educational context.97
In lieu of clear FERPA guidelines, parents and privacy advocates are
leading the movement for increased transparency and security protocols for
EdTech companies.98
Following public outcry over their lack of
transparency, EdTech company InBloom was forced to shut down due to
revenue loss.99 Similarly, Electronic Frontier Foundation, a privacy
advocacy group, filed a lawsuit in 2014 forcing Google to acknowledge that
it mined data from student accounts for core services outside of the Google
Apps for Education.100
III. NO MAN’S LAND OF OVERSIGHT:
HOW EDTECH IS OPERATING IN A REGULATION VACUUM
Due to outdated regulatory definitions and counteracting enforcement
guidelines, the EdTech industry is exploiting a loophole in federal
regulations to mine children’s online data for financial gain.101 By
connecting with schools as authorized educational partners, EdTech
companies’ data collection is governed by FERPA’s education record
guidelines.102 However, today’s online operators collect and store
information that far exceeds the traditional school records FERPA was
designed to protect, specifically the expansion to indirect and inferred
data.103 Furthermore, the very personal nature of this data exceeds FERPA’s
directory definition and, therefore, should require parental consent prior to
disclosure.104
In addition to running afoul of FERPA’s legislative intent, EdTech
companies’ data practices place student information at far greater risk than
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 61.
See Kurshan, supra note 75.
Id.
Id.
See Kronk, supra note 10 (describing the loophole in FERPA regulation that
permits schools to disclose student PII to EdTech companies without parental or student
consent by considering the company an authorized school official).
102. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1) (2018); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1)(i)(A) (2020)
(expanding FERPA’s permitted disclosure of education records to third-party entities if
they are authorized educational partners).
103. See CHILDREN’S COMM’R, supra note 57, at 5–8 (describing the expansive list of
data used today, including vast amounts of data collected automatically from online
applications).
104. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.30(a) (requiring written parental consent prior to disclosing
information). But see Drake, supra note 61 (providing scenarios where schools’ online
interactions would not be considered education records regulated under FERPA).
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traditional education records housed and maintained by individual
schools.105 The large-scale data collected online feeds into the datafication
of children, placing their safety and online identities at risk of improper
mining, use, or theft.106 Neither individual schools nor the ED are adequately
prepared to oversee FERPA compliance within the EdTech industry.107
Unlike schools, commercial companies are not subject to financial
repercussions or disciplinary actions by ED for violating FERPA.108
Subsequently, FERPA provides no regulatory incentive for EdTech
companies to provide adequate transparency and privacy protection.109
Outside of school education records, COPPA governs the data collection for
children by online operators.110 COPPA is well-positioned for oversight
enforcement because the FTC investigates complaints and can impose
financial penalties and business restrictions upon companies found to be in
violation of the Act.111
a. EdTech’s Expansive Collection of Student Data
Transcends the Realm of FERPA’s Education Records
EdTech companies exploit FERPA’s overly broad definition of education
records to mine enormous amounts of children’s online data, largely without
notice and absent parental consent.112 FERPA limits school disclosure

105. See Sullivan, supra note 5 (comparing traditional and digital files to advocate for
heightened EdTech security).
106. See id. (relaying events where student PII was stolen and used for extortion); see
also FEDER, supra note 12, at 5–6 (noting that privacy advocates are concerned about the
risks to student privacy that data sharing poses).
107. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.1(a) (limiting FERPA enforcement to educational institutions
that receive federal funds administered by the Secretary of Education).
108. See Brandon Wong, FERPA: The Joke with No Punchline, AM. ENTER. INST.:
BLOG (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.aei.org/education/ferpa-joke-punchline/ (noting that
FERPA only applies to institutions that are recipients of federal funds, not for-profit
EdTech companies).
109. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.1 (indicating that FERPA regulations are limited to
educational institutions receiving federal funding).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1) (2018); 16 C.F.R. § 312.3 (2020).
111. See, e.g., Alexi Pfeffer-Gillett, Peeling Back the Student Privacy Pledge, 16
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 100, 130 (2018) (discussing how the FTC’s investigations and
consumer oversight align with consumers’ right to accurate information, and the FTC
has the ability to hold companies accountable with financial and procedural remedies);
see also Mamaysky, supra note 8 (predicting increased investigation of online operators’
adherence to COPPA is signaled by the FTC’s record-setting 2019 YouTube settlement
for COPPA violations).
112. See Kronk, supra note 10 (describing the loophole in FERPA regulation that
permits schools to disclose PII to EdTech companies without parental or student consent
by considering the commercial entity an authorized school official).
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policies to information directly linked to a student, related to their education,
and maintained by the school as an education record.113 However, EdTech
applications often fail to meet all of these FERPA requirements for education
records.114 EdTech companies are indiscriminately gathering information
not directly linked to students’ education.115
First, the technological advancements of online applications have negated
the protections of limiting FERPA to records directly linked to a student.116
If a student’s image is captured incidentally or as part of the background at
a school event, the ED does not consider the image to be directly related to
a student and, therefore, not an education record.117 In that instance, schools
can still publish or share the image without obtaining the consent of the
student by reasoning that the inadvertent peripheral image contained no PII
data beyond directory information.118 There is little risk of harm or invasion
of privacy for a student if he appeared anonymously in the background of a
photo printed in a newspaper.119
However, unlike the traditional directory information disclosed by a
school, online operators present more tangible risks to a student’s privacy if
caught in the background of an image due to the technological advancements
of the application.120 EdTech companies place student privacy at risk
because they make student PII more obtainable when online applications can
use machine learning and AI algorithms to identify individuals in the
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (2018).
114. See Jackie Gharapour Wernz, Are Emails, Texts, Tweets, and Other Digital

Communications Student Records Under FERPA and State Law?, JD SUPRA (Feb. 20,
2013), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/are-emails-texts-tweets-and-other-dig-609
50/ (discussing the ambiguous area of applying FERPA to digital communication records
when the files are not considered education records under the Act).
115. See ALIM ET AL., supra note 54, at 5 (detailing how EdTech applications datagathering goes beyond traditional PII to include behavioral information, search terms,
contact lists, location data, and browsing history).
116. See id. (highlighting the exponential increase in data as a result of technology
applications’ ability to generate new data).
117. See FAQS ON PHOTOS, supra note 21 (describing how images are not directly
linked to students captured in the background, but the school still must obtain parental
consent to disclose the photo or alternatively classify the image as directory information).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We Know
It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/
clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html (last updated Feb. 10, 2020) (explaining the
ability for computer programming to collect images online and then use algorithms to
convert the images into vectors, mathematical formulas, that are grouped together to
identify individuals; a technology being used to eliminate anonymity of faces in
background or surveillance images by more than 600 law enforcement agencies with
Clearview AI).
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background or tag the image’s geolocation to expose the child’s location.121
Applications such as Google Photos also use AI technology to scan images
to identify any faces captured in photos, even faces in the background or
indirect focus of the image.122
In those instances, there is an equivalent risk of privacy invasion for both
the directly linked student and any children incidentally captured because the
online application is equally collecting and tracking student PII.123 Due to
these technological advancements, FERPA’s guidelines to determine direct
linkage to a student in traditional media are incompatible with the enormous
capabilities of online applications.124
Second, EdTech companies’ capability to capture and generate new types
of data is testing the limits of educational context required under FERPA.125
Data simply obtained by an educational institution or agent is not
automatically considered to be within the educational context of FERPA
regulation.126 Under the Act, education records are limited only to
121. See, e.g., Matthew Lynch, U.S. PreK-12 Schools Explore Adopting Facial
Recognition Software, TECH EDVOCATE (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.thetech
edvocate.org/u-s-prek-12-schools-explore-adopting-facial-recognition-software/
(highlighting EdTech applications’ use of facial recognition, including measuring
student engagement in China by scanning faces to determine if a student is engaged,
tired, or distracted).
122. How Google Uses Pattern Recognition to Make Sense of Images, GOOGLE,
https://policies.google.com/technologies/pattern-recognition?hl=en (last visited Aug.
11, 2020) (describing how computers use pattern recognition to identify faces in photos);
see Dale Smith, Google Knows What You Look Like. Here’s What it Means and How to
Opt Out, CNET (Feb. 4, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/google-knowswhat-you-look-like-heres-what-it-means-and-how-to-opt-out/ (explaining ways Google
is acquiring, storing, and using facial data).
123. Compare 34 C.F.R. § 99.1 (2020) (requiring FERPA education records to be
directly linked to the student and maintained by the school), with FAQS ON PHOTOS,
supra note 21 (describing how incidental images are not regulated by FERPA).
124. See Thomas Germain, How a Photo’s Hidden ‘Exif’ Data Exposes Your Personal
Information, CONSUMER REPS., https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/what-canyou-tell-from-photo-exif-data/ (last updated Dec. 6, 2019) (describing how images
capture location through GPS data). Compare FAQS ON PHOTOS, supra note 21 (arguing
children included in the background of an image are not covered under FERPA because
there is little likelihood of an invasion of privacy), with Lily Hay Newman, AI Can
Recognize Your Face Even if You’re Pixelated, WIRED (Sept. 12, 2016, 11:54 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2016/09/machine-learning-can-identify-pixelated-facesresearchers-show/ (describing how machine learning can be used to defeat privacy
protection technologies by identifying pixelated or obfuscated faces in images and
videos).
125. See ALIM ET AL., supra note 54, at 24 (explaining how EdTech applications are
gathering indirect and inferred information found solely in online applications).
126. See What Records Are Exempted from FERPA?, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://
studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/what-records-are-exempted-ferpa (last visited Aug. 11, 2020)
(listing files that are not considered education records collected by schools ).
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information collected relating to a student’s education.127 However, a feature
that distinguishes online applications from traditional school records is the
ability to collect vast amounts of engagement data that schools did not collect
previously.128
The indirect and inferred data EdTech applications collect often exceeds
the traditional PII found within the permanent student file directly
maintained by the school.129 Online applications collect geolocations of
users, IP addresses, and biometric data such as heart rate or activity levels.130
Additionally, many online applications retain information generated from
online messaging, file sharing, and email communication between users.131
The expanding universe of indirect data EdTech companies are amassing is
then compiled with direct information disclosed by schools, such as grades,
attendance, or test scores, to predict behavior or develop learning
strategies.132 Unlike grades or attendance, the relationship between browser
preferences, geolocation, or social communications with other users in web
chats is, at best, tenuously related to a student’s education.133
Third, schools can fail to maintain the data collected by EdTech
companies as required by FERPA. The ED requires documents to be
127. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A) (2018).
128. See CHILDREN’S COMM’R, supra note 57, at 6 (distinguishing the various types

of data collected online, specifically new data “given off” unknowingly by users online,
such as cookies). Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(5)(A) (defining traditional directory
information such as name, address, and school activities), with 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2020)
(tailoring the personal identifiers for COPPA regulation to online services and
applications by including online contact, persistent identifiers, and geolocations).
129. See ALIM ET AL., supra note 54, at 24.
130. See CHILDREN’S COMM’R, supra note 57, at 3 (arguing the data collected on
children through connected devices, monitoring equipment, and social media is
exponentially expanding the amount of data harvested compared to previous
generations).
131. See, e.g., CLASSDOJO, HOW DOES CLASSDOJO BUILD A POSITIVE SCHOOL
COMMUNITY? 1–2 (n.d.), https://static.classdojo.com/docs/TeacherResources/School
LeaderPack/ClassDojo-SchoolLeaderPack.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2020) (highlighting
application features that allow for officials to share stories, images, and messages with
parents); Jeff Knutson, Essential Tips and Tools to Improve the Parent-Teacher
Communication Loop, COMMONSENSE EDUC. (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.common
sense.org/education/articles/6-tech-tools-that-boost-teacher-parent-communication
(promoting EdTech messaging applications that increase communication between
students, teachers, and parents).
132. See CHILDREN’S COMM’R, supra note 57, at 6 (defining inferred data as an
analysis combining direct and indirect information to then form a prediction).
133. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A) (limiting education records to files that
contain information directly linked to a student and are maintained by the educational
agency or institution), with Wernz, supra note 114 (discussing the ambiguous area of
applying FERPA to digital communication when the files are not considered education
records).
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maintained and stored by a school, or its agent to be regulated by FERPA.134
In addition to storing data, schools must demonstrate the file was retained
with some degree of permanency to be considered an education record, such
as retaining the record in a filing cabinet or permanent secure database.135
Even while EdTech companies collect information as agents for schools,
there is still a requirement to show an intent to hold the data as part of a
permanent record.136 Otherwise, the electronic data can be considered
temporary in nature and outside FERPA regulation.137 Guidelines for
demonstrating a deliberate action to retain, such as attaching an email to a
permanent file, also apply to agents of schools.138 However, the limitless
availability of storage nullifies the permanency requirement as previously
presented to schools.139 By transitioning education records from physical
mediums to digital files offsite in cloud servers, schools have virtually
unlimited storage space and digital data is being captured at exponentially
higher rates due to ease.140
Without physical constraints, vast amounts of data collected through
EdTech applications fail to meet FERPA requirements because they are
generated and shared between users instead of with schools.141 Userprovided information such as profile submissions and webchat discussions
between classmates are more closely analogous to peer-graded assignments,
classmate feedback, or group projects than school records because the data
originates outside of the educational context.142 The ED has determined that
peer-graded assignments are not considered education records under FERPA
134. 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2020); see 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).
135. See Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 432–33 (2002)

(holding that FERPA suggests a method of permanency or intent to retain files as a
statutory requirement).
136. See S.A. v. Tulare Cty. Office of Educ., No. CV F 08-1215 LJO GSA, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 93170, at *9–10 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2009) (holding emails are temporary and
only education records if printed and placed in a student file).
137. See Drake, supra note 61 (discussing when email communications can be
education records governed by FERPA).
138. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31 (a)(1)(i)(B); see also Kronk, supra note 10 (describing risks
associated with FERPA’s extension of authorized school officials to third-party
commercial companies).
139. See CHILDREN’S COMM’R, supra note 57, at 11 (describing the increase of
connected devices gathering information, paired with advancements in data processing
to generate predictive inferred data, which means online data is exponentially growing).
140. See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 1–2.
141. See Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 433–35 (finding
peer grades are not education records because school officials did not capture the data or
create it with the intent of retaining in a permanent file).
142. See Wernz, supra note 114 (highlighting the ambiguous area of applying FERPA
to classroom applications, specifically the characteristics of user-submitted information).
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because the documents originate outside of school officials.143 Similarly,
online communication between peers should not be considered education
records protected by FERPA.144 Furthermore, the records must be
maintained by FERPA standards, preventing disclosure to non-authorized
parties.145 While offsite servers may still be considered secure by enlisting
password authentication, many applications feature the ability for end users
to view other users’ accounts, activity, and records.146
Further compounding the issue of maintaining records, many EdTech
companies disclose student data to additional third parties to capture, store,
and process the collected data.147 The vast network created through EdTech
services is multi-layered and far more complex than schools’ traditional
record keeping practices.148 As a result, EdTech operators are comingling
traditional educational information, such as attendance and grades, with data
generated from social features such as peer messaging or photo sharing.149
Information generated from social features in the online applications is more
analogous to temporary email communications that are not considered
education records.150
Finally, even if information meets FERPA’s education record standards,
143. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii) (2018) (limiting FERPA education records to
files “maintained” by a school); 534 U.S. at 434–35 (confirming that the ED
interpretation of “maintained” education records to be “kept by a single central
custodian” through “describing a ‘school official’ and ‘his assistants’ as the personnel
responsible for the custody of the records”).
144. 534 U.S. at 432–33 (explaining that education records are not “maintained” when
students grade their peers’ work because student graders are not acting on behalf of an
educational institution).
145. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(6) (2020).
146. See Erin Klein, 5 Apps to Share Class Work Beyond the Classroom!,
SCHOLASTIC: TOP TEACHING BLOG (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.scholastic.com/
teachers/blog-posts/erin-klein/5-apps-share-class-work-beyond-classroom/ (describing
online applications that can be used to share classroom and student information with
parents).
147. See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 17 (reporting that ninety-five percent of
selected school districts shared student information with third parties through cloud
computing arrangements).
148. See GIRARD KELLY ET AL., COMMON SENSE MEDIA, 2019 STATE OF EDTECH
PRIVACY REPORT 47 (2019), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/sites/default/files/
uploads/research/2019-state-of-edtech-privacy-report.pdf (finding that seventy-nine
percent of EdTech applications or services share student information with third parties
for analytics and data tracking).
149. See id. at 50 (discussing that more than half of surveyed applications risk data
being shared through social or federated logins on third-party sites such as Facebook).
150. See S.A. v. Tulare Cty. Office of Educ., No. CV F 08-1215 LJO GSA, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 93170, at *9–10 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2009) (holding that because emails have
a “fleeting nature,” they are only education records if printed and placed in a student
file).
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EdTech companies are collecting metadata, behavioral observations, and
predictive classifications that exceed student directory information.151 Like
disclosing non-directory information, such as social security numbers,
schools are required to obtain parental consent prior to using EdTech
applications to generate and disclose a student’s non-directory
information.152 A grounding principle of FERPA is the strong foundation in
promoting parental transparency.153
b. Disclosure of Student Information to EdTech
Runs Afoul of FERPA’s Intent
Congress enacted FERPA to protect the process for disclosing students’
education records.154 As emphasized in a letter from the cosponsors,
FERPA’s intent is to protect student data by regulating how schools release
records and promote transparency through parental access.155 The ED erred
by loosening the guidelines for schools to release student education records
to authorized third parties because this extension does not align with the
original intent of the statute.156
First, the 2011 Amendments decrease transparency for students and
parents regarding school records.157 FERPA originally limited disclosure to
educational institutions and agencies for financial aid, but the 2011
Amendments permit disclosure to commercial companies in the tech
industry.158 Additionally, many tech companies rely on several third-party
applications or services to run analytics, store data, or partner services.159
151. See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 24 (finding that several school districts
inadvertently entered contractual agreements that permitted the outsourcing of student
information to third parties).
152. 34 C.F.R. § 99.30 (2020).
153. See ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., supra note 31 (clarifying that schools must notify
parents of their rights under FERPA annually, including their right to review their
children’s education records).
154. See STUDENT PRESS L. CTR., supra note 15.
155. See id.; Greenberg, supra note 15.
156. See, e.g., Kronk, supra note 10 (describing that the expansion of FERPA permits
schools to disclose student PII to EdTech companies without parental or student
consent); see also STUDENT PRESS L. CTR., supra note 15 (describing that the driving
factors for Sen. James Buckley in coauthoring the FERPA legislation were the lack of
parental access to student records and a lack of consistency in schools’ policies governing
disclosure of student records).
157. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1)(i)(B).
158. Id.
159. See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 24 (“Fordham CLIP’s research
revealed . . . [that] many [district schools] did not seem to understand the nature of the
services that they outsourced to third-party providers.”).
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Schools are not required to notify parents if disclosing student information
that does not require prior parental consent, including data disclosed to thirdparty commercial companies acting as authorized educational partners.160
As a result, the amendments expose student data to a wide range of entities
beyond educational institutions, including commercial technology
companies such as Google, Amazon Web Services, and Apple.161
Second, by not limiting approved authorized third parties to educational
institutions or non-profit companies, schools can release information to
commercial companies who provide a service or product.162 The 2011
Amendments permit schools to release records to commercial companies
who may then profit from the monetization of student data.163 However, the
penalty for violating FERPA regulations is limited to the withholding of
federal funding to schools or educational institutions, and does not extend to
any financial penalty for commercial companies.164 The ED has no oversight
or enforcement power over commercial companies.165 Data collected
through online applications from individual consumers instead of schools
face stricter regulations under COPPA.166 However, the FTC’s decision to
not investigate online applications receiving information from schools
permits commercial companies to effectively operate without oversight.167
Under this gap, EdTech companies can collect and use data disclosed from
student accounts, obtained without parental consent, that the ED may
determine were not in fact education records and thus should instead require
160. See DEP’T OF EDUC., THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY ACT
GUIDANCE FOR ELIGIBLE STUDENTS 3 (2011) [hereinafter DEP’T OF EDUC., FERPA
GUIDANCE], https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/for-eligible-students.pdf
(describing schools’ notification obligations for data disclosed without parental consent).
161. See Greenberg, supra note 15 (discussing how FERPA guidelines do not limit
the type of entity a school can authorize as an educational partner and receive student
data).
162. See Kurshan, supra note 75 (warning conflicts can arise when commercial
companies that rely on data mining and advertising to raise revenue have access to vast
amounts of student information).
163. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1)(i)(B).
164. See Wong, supra note 108 (positing that FERPA creates no mechanism for
enforcement on companies because the law’s drafters did not envision commercial
purposes for disclosing student data).
165. See id.
166. Compare 34 C.F.R. § 99.67(a) (listing the remedies available to the ED to
enforce FERPA that are all tied to withholding or prohibiting federal funding for school
programs), with 16 C.F.R. § 312.9 (2020) (stating the remedies available to the FTC for
COPPA violations include financial penalties to commercial companies).
167. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(F) (2018); see also REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note
9, at 11 (explaining that COPPA does not apply to information about a child that is
obtained directly from a school).
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parental consent as governed under COPPA.168 The exception allowing
schools to grant consent, on behalf of parents, under the assumption that the
information pertains to education records, regardless of its actual nature,
makes this analysis only retrospective with the result that EdTech companies
receive such information to use at will without constraint or oversight. 169
As a result of the 2011 Amendments, school guidelines have reinstated the
wide disparity in school disclosure policies for releasing student records.170
Congress enacted FERPA to address school disclosure policies that were
inconsistent and unregulated.171 However, the ED’s decision to expand
authorized disclosure to include third-party commercial companies, such as
EdTech companies, as authorized educational partners creates a wide range
of data exposure and enforcement concerns.172 The original FERPA
guidelines limited the release of student records to educational institutions,
parties for financial aid, and governments.173 Today, schools can release
information to EdTech companies who, in turn, share the information with
additional partners.174 Since the 2011 Amendments to FERPA, EdTech
companies collect and use children’s PII without prior parental consent.175
FERPA, created in response to school’s inconsistent and irregular practices
of disclosing information, now authorizes schools wide latitude in disclosure
of student PII.176

168. REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 2; see Kronk, supra note 10 (explaining that
EdTech programs collect unlimited personal information and disclose it to other third
parties).
169. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a) (limiting FERPA violation investigations by the ED to
educational institutions receiving federal funding, which does not include commercial
EdTech companies).
170. See Carr, supra note 87 (highlighting the disparity within school systems and the
challenge it poses for implementing security protocols in school systems); see also
REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 21.
171. See Greenberg, supra note 15 (discussing FERPA’s intent to increase
transparency and parental oversight of student data).
172. Kronk, supra note 10.
173. 34 C.F.R. § 99.1(a); see also Kronk, supra note 10.
174. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a) (allowing schools and educational partners to share
student data with third parties).
175. See id. (noting that schools may disclose information without prior parental
consent to third parties if a school has outsourced institutional services to the company).
176. Compare ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., supra note 31 (discussing Sen. James
Buckley’s and Sen. Claiborne Pell’s intent for FERPA), with FEDER, supra note 12, at
5–6 (noting the impact of the 2011 FERPA amendment, which allows schools to disclose
student information to third-party companies).
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c. Schools and the Department of Education Are Ill-Equipped
to Enforce FERPA Compliance in EdTech
The wide latitude in school data policies, combined with the ED’s inability
to enforce FERPA regulations on commercial companies, creates a zone of
unaccountability.177 Schools are ill-equipped to oversee data mining by
EdTech companies.178 Consequently, EdTech companies exploit the gap in
oversight created by the combination of the ED’s inability to enforce FERPA
violation penalties against commercial companies and the FTC’s refusal to
oversee student data disclosed by schools.179
Given the proliferation of data generated by online services, it is
unreasonable for schools to complete a case-by-case determination on
whether inferred or indirect data meets the education record definition.180
Direct information is shared with EdTech applications and online operators
daily by school administrators, teachers, and students.181 Beyond the direct
information, online applications are collecting vast amounts of indirect and
inferred data that schools, parents, and users are simply unaware of.182
However, the ED relies on the individual context of each record to determine
if FERPA applies.183 Because many schools are implementing third-party
applications due to lack of resources, it follows then that schools with limited
resources do not have the bandwidth to oversee educational partners’ FERPA
compliance.184 Thus, there is little to no oversight of data collection,

177. See Kronk, supra note 10 (explaining a gap in FERPA regulation created by
expanding disclosures to third parties).
178. See id.; see also REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 24 (finding many districts
had inadequate data governance policies for outsourced data collection, including twenty
percent of study respondents with no policies addressing teacher’s use of services).
179. See Kronk, supra note 10.
180. See FAQS ON PHOTOS, supra note 21 (explaining the case-by-case process by
which the ED reviews whether a photo or video is an education record governed by
FERPA).
181. See DELOITTE, 2016 DIGITAL EDUCATION SURVEY 4 (2016), https://www2.
deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/technology-mediatelecommunications/us-tmt-digital-education-survey.pdf (finding that more than fifty
percent of teachers use three digital devices every week in their classrooms, with fortytwo percent of teachers reporting they use at least one device daily).
182. See ALIM ET AL., supra note 54, at 15; see also, e.g., Singer, How Google Took
Over, supra note 11 (reporting that Google declines to disclose details for how it gathers
and uses student data, and whether student data is comingled with commercial
applications).
183. See Drake, supra note 61 (explaining the various ways digital data on social
media may be considered education records).
184. See Sullivan, supra note 5 (noting that schools lack funds and resources to
provide the latest security technology).
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retention, and use by third-party companies partnering with schools.185
Furthermore, while schools may own the data EdTech companies collect
from students, these records are metadata, behavioral observations, and
predictive classifications; none of these categories are considered directory
information under FERPA.186
Similar to disclosing non-directory
information such as social security numbers, schools should obtain parental
consent prior to using EdTech applications to generate non-directory
information on students.187 The adoption of third-party commercial
companies as authorized educational partners is alarming because of the
widespread use of EdTech applications in schools and the lack of
transparency companies provide about their data practices.188 This lack of
transparency and lax oversight ultimately result in increased risks to student
privacy and risk of data breach.189
Another flaw with FERPA regulating school disclosure to EdTech
companies is the non-existent threat of enforcement.190 During the forty-five
years since FERPA’s enactment, ED has never withheld federal funding
from a school in violation of the statute.191 Without an actual risk of funding
loss, there is little incentive for schools to diligently verify that commercial
partners, and any third-party commercial companies they share information
with, are FERPA compliant.192
By implementing a case-by-case approach instead of clearly defining the
education record parameters, the ED creates a self-serving opportunity for
schools to assert a broad application of FERPA to student data collected
through authorized EdTech applications.193 Schools avoid the logistics of
185. See FEDER, supra note 12, at 5–6 (noting the response to the ED’s 2011 revised
FERPA guidelines and the impact of expanding access of personal information to third
parties allowed schools to disclose PII without parental consent).
186. See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 4 (defining directory information to
include details such as the “student’s name, address . . . date and place of birth, major
field of study,” and attendance information).
187. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2018) (requiring parental consent prior to
disclosure of non-directory information).
188. See FEDER, supra note 12, at 2.
189. See Kurshan, supra note 75 (describing threats to student privacy from EdTech
applications, recommending EdTech products require more monitoring, and
emphasizing the need for clarity regarding when companies should be allowed in
classrooms).
190. See PARENT COAL., supra note 38 (stating that as of 2019, the ED has never
rescinded funding or issued a financial penalty against a school for violating FERPA
regulations).
191. Id.
192. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1)(i)(B) (2020) (requiring schools to verify that thirdparty vendors are FERPA compliant).
193. Id.; see also STUDENT PRESS L. CTR., supra note 15 (arguing the lack of guidance
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obtaining parental consent, and online operators avoid FTC oversight for
COPPA compliance by painting a broad education record umbrella.194
This circular logic leaves parents and students with little recourse for
privacy violations resulting from schools granting consent on an individual’s
behalf and sharing student data with an EdTech company.195 Without a
private right of action to sue in courts, parents can only file complaints with
the ED.196 To further complicate the matter, the ED only investigates
education record determinations after a valid complaint is filed, and the ED
requires parents to specify what records they are seeking for review from the
school.197
IV. HOW TO CLOSE THE SCHOOL CONSENT LOOPHOLE
GRANTING EDTECH ACCESS TO CHILDREN’S PII
The gap in oversight of the EdTech industry’s collection and use of student
data can be addressed by amending FERPA guidelines to narrowly tailor the
disclosure of student data to non-commercial companies or requiring
notification and clear parental consent.198 Alternatively, the loophole can be
closed by revoking the school exemption to COPPA enforcement and
empowering the FTC to address commercial company violations with
monetary fines and remedial efforts.199
by the ED has led to a pattern of abuse by schools using FERPA’s individual review of
education records definition to avoid requests for records).
194. See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 24–25 (summarizing studies showing
that school contracts with cloud services often lack compliance and have weak data
governance).
195. See Greenberg, supra note 15 (“The U.S. Supreme Court held . . . that
individuals and organizations cannot sue to enforce F[ERPA]. The flawed decision
effectively closed the courts to students [and] parents . . . harmed by F[ERPA] fouls.”);
see also Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that there is no
language in the statute or legislative history indicating congressional intent for a private
right of action); Slovinec v. DePaul Univ., 222 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060–61 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (affirming that there is no congressional intent to create private right of action
under FERPA).
196. See Ashford v. Edmond Pub. Sch. Dist., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1200 (W.D. Okla.
2011) (upholding dismissal of student claim because FERPA fails to confer individually
enforceable rights).
197. See DEP’T OF EDUC., FERPA GUIDANCE, supra note 160, at 6 (describing the ED
investigation process of valid FERPA complaints); see also Wernz, supra note 114
(referencing ED instructions clarifying parent’s responsibility to specify the records he
is seeking access to).
198. See Kronk, supra note 10 (describing the loophole in FERPA regulation
permitting schools to disclose student PII to EdTech companies without parental or
student consent).
199. See Pfeffer-Gillett, supra note 111, at 134 (discussing the FTC’s ability to hold
EdTech companies accountable with financial and procedural remedies).
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a. Limit the Reach of FERPA by Narrowly Tailoring Disclosure
of Education Records
The ED can amend FERPA guidelines to narrow the definition of
education records. By tailoring the definition of education records to data
necessary for education, the ED can release more oversight of PII back to the
FTC for COPPA enforcement. Today’s broad definition of education
records permits EdTech companies to collect and store all data captured
through school contracts by stating the service or application is used for an
educational context, including new types of indirect and inferred data
generated and stored only within the application.200 By narrowing the scope
of education records, EdTech companies and schools will be required to
notify and obtain parental consent for collection and use of student data that
exceeds an educational context, such as geolocation or IP addresses.201
The ED could further decrease safety risks to students by limiting the
information shared without parental consent. Recognizing the increased risk
of disclosing sensitive online information such as images and location
identifiers, the ED could limit the information shared with online operators
to traditional directory information.202 Requiring parental consent for nondirectory information may increase awareness about student privacy
concerns, promote parent engagement, and increase corporate
accountability.203
b. Eliminate the FTC’s School Exemption for COPPA Compliance
To create accountability for the EdTech industry, the FTC can amend the
COPPA school exemption to apply strictly to educational institutions.
Today, commercial EdTech businesses can collect student information with
only the consent of the school when acting as authorized educational
partners.204 However, even when acting as an agent of a school, EdTech
companies remain commercial online operators.205 By revoking the FTC
200. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1)(B)(1) (2020) (allowing EdTech applications to
capture student PII if the company asserts that the information is part of the service or
function the company was contracted to provide as a school official).
201. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2018) (allowing the disclosure of education records
to a broad range of entities, including other educational institutions, courts, and
consultants acting on behalf of the school).
202. See id. § 1232g(a)(5) (defining traditional directory information such as name,
address, and school activities).
203. See REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 30 (suggesting that requiring parental
consent could improve data compliance with FERPA).
204. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a).
205. See 15 U.S.C. § 6501(2)(A) (2018) (limiting operators regulated under COPPA
to services “operated for commercial purposes”).
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school exception or, at a minimum, narrowing the restriction to noncommercial online operators, the FTC can ensure the privacy protection
safeguards of COPPA remain intact for all online businesses.206
To ensure COPPA compliance, the FTC encourages adherence by
providing guidance through rules, statements, and settlements for
violations.207 Unlike FERPA’s vaguely defined education record standards,
COPPA provides detailed categories of the types of data that fall within the
legislation.208 COPPA also recognizes the evolving nature of technology and
prescribes to regular reviews to keep the legislation current.209
Finally, the potentially most effective tool to increase security of student
data would be to have the FTC enforce COPPA compliance to all
commercial companies collecting and using children’s PII.210 Regardless if
EdTech companies contract directly with schools, if the company is
providing a commercial service, it should be COPPA compliant. The FTC
is better suited to review data violations by online operators because it can
consistently apply the same investigation and analysis processes for potential
COPPA violations, regardless of whether the online operator receives
consent from a school or parent.
Moreover, remedies available for COPPA violations are not limited to
federal funding restrictions, which do not apply to commercial companies.211
In addition to applying financial penalties, the FTC can affect industry
change through remedial requirements as part of a settlement.212 Currently,
the lack of financial penalties in FERPA’s history provide little deterrence
for malfeasance or bad actors in the EdTech industry.213 Paired with the lack
206. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Complying with COPPA, supra note 9 (describing
how companies are not required to obtain parental consent for student PII obtained from
a school district if the information is for “use and benefit of the school” because school
districts are governed by FERPA).
207. See 15 U.S.C. § 6505(b) (listing relevant provisions for compliance
enforcement).
208. See id. § 6501(8) (outlining personal information covered by COPPA).
209. See FTC Strengthens Kids’ Privacy, Gives Parents Greater Control Over Their
Information By Amending Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/12/ftcstrengthens-kids-privacy-gives-parents-greater-control-over (noting the FTC’s 2010
review of COPPA and the subsequent 2012 amendment to reflect the changes in
technology).
210. See Pfeffer-Gillett, supra note 111, at 130 (arguing that the FTC can hold
educational service providers accountable).
211. See id. at 134 (noting two examples of FTC remedies for COPPA violations).
212. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 51 (discussing FTC’s
settlement with TRUSTe Inc.).
213. See PARENT COAL., supra note 38 (suggesting the lack of financial penalties for
FERPA violations do not promote compliance but instead invite lackluster oversight).
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of access to an individual right of action, FERPA gives little recourse for
individuals. By revoking the school exception to COPPA enforcement, the
FTC can ensure adequate oversight of online operators in the EdTech
industry by holding all commercial online operators to the same standards
for collection and use of student data.214
V. CONCLUSION
By expanding disclosure of student records to third-party commercial
companies, the current FERPA guidelines decrease transparency, place
student data at risk, and are askew with the legislative intent. To close the
loophole, the ED can amend FERPA guidelines to limit schools’ disclosure
of student data to non-commercial third parties or require parental consent.
Alternatively, the FTC can amend the school exemption to investigate and
enforce COPPA violations of commercial companies that receive student
data from schools. The FTC is better equipped to classify and enforce data
privacy protections for online operators and provide effective deterrence
measures against commercial EdTech companies.

214. FED. TRADE COMM’N, Complying with COPPA, supra note 9 (discussing online
operators’ requirements to meet COPPA and FTC enforcement regulations).

